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Kootenai Co. Case CR-2011-17700
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REVIEW

Appellant, Barclay Bennett, submits the following in support of his petition for review.
A. Nature of the Case

This is an appeal from Mr. Bennett's judgment of conviction for possession of a
methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court's judgment of conviction in an unpublished opinion. State v. Bennett, Docket No.
40770 (Ct. App., October 1, 2014). Mr. Bennett now seeks review from this Court.
B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts

On September 30, 2011, Mr. Bennett was charged with possession of a controlled
substance (methamphetamine), a felony, in violation ofldaho Code§ 37-2732(c)(l) as well as
being a persistent violator pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-2514. R. 30-31. The State alleged that
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on or about that same day, Mr. Bennett "did knowingly and unlawfully possess a controlled
substance, to-wit: Methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance .... " Id. On October
3, 2011, the Kootenai County Public Defender was appointed to represent Mr. Bennett. R. 36.
A preliminary hearing was then held on October 13, 2011. R. 40-4 7. At the conclusion of that
hearing the Honorable Clark Peterson found there was sufficient cause to believe Mr. Bennett
was guilty of possession of a controlled substance and ordered Mr. Bennett bound over to the
District Court. R. 47. An Information was subsequently filed and in addition to the felony
possession of a controlled substance charge and the persistent violator allegation, the Information
filed on October 19, 2011, also charged Mr. Bennett with possession of drug paraphernalia, a
misdemeanor, in violation ofldaho Code§ 37-2734A.
Mr. Bennett entered pleas of not guilty before the district court. R. 57-60. On June 22,
2012, an Amended Information was filed with the only substantive change relating to the
previous convictions being considered for the persistent violator allegation. Following a series
of continuances and the assignment of a conflict public defender, a jury trial was eventually
scheduled to commence September 12, 2012. R. 119.
At trial the State called five witnesses. Testifying first was Sergeant Jonathon Brandel
with the Kootenai County Sheriff's Department. Transcript on Appeal ("Tr."), p. 16, ln. 15 - p.
17, ln. 10. On September 29, 2011, Sgt. Brandel began a graveyard shift at 10:00 p.m. that
would end at 8:00 a.m. the following morning. Tr. p. 19, Ins. 11-16. At midnight that evening
he arrived at a residence along with Deputy Ryan Miller and Deputy Erik Hedlund. Tr. p. 19, In.
21 - p. 20, In. 16. Upon arriving at the residence Sgt. Brandel and Deputy Miller entered the
residence, went upstairs, and knocked on a bedroom door. Tr. p. 20, Ins. 21-24. Through the
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closed door Sgt. Brandel called out "Barclay." Tr. p. 21, Ins. 7-8. Hearing movement, Sgt.
Brandel identified himself as being with the Sheriffs department and ordered the person inside
the bedroom to come to the door. Tr. p. 21, Ins. 8-9. With no further response from the
bedroom's occupants, law enforcement pushed the door open and entered the bedroom. Tr. p.
21, Ins. 17-19.
Upon entering, Sgt. Brandel was able to note the room was cluttered and lived in. Tr. p.
22, Ins. 9-22. He described the furniture in the room as consisting of a nightstand with a
television, dresser, bed, and perhaps a chair. Tr. p. 23, In. 17 - p. 24, In. 6. He explained that
Mr. Bennett and a woman were both standing. Tr. p. 24, Ins. 15 - 17. Mr. Bennett was near an
open dresser with his back to law enforcement with his hands at his waist. Tr. p. 25, Ins. 12-15;
Tr. p. 35, Ins. 11-16. Bree Larson, the woman in room with Mr. Bennett, was standing similarly
with her back to law enforcement at the opposite end of the bed. Tr. p. 35, In. 20 - p. 36, In. 4.
Responding to Sgt. Brandel's command, Mr. Bennett immediately showed his hands to law
enforcement and was handcuffed. Tr. p. 25, In. 19 - p. 26, In. 6; Tr. p. 35, Ins. 17-19.
Sgt. Brandel then handed Mr. Bennett off to Deputy Miller. Tr. p. 27, Ins. 13-14. Sgt.
Brandel then glanced at the open dresser drawer to make sure a weapon had not been placed
inside and as he was turning away saw on top of the dresser, among some men's toiletries, a
small plastic container containing what he recognized to be contraband. Tr. p. 27, In. 17 - p. 28,
In. 8. Sgt. Brandel picked up the container, examined it more closely, and believing the
substance was methamphetamine, handed the clear plastic container to Deputy Miller. Tr. p. 29,
In. 17 - p. 31, In. 6. Sgt. Brandel further testified photographs of the bedroom were never taken
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and a witness statement was not collected from Ms. Larson. Tr. p. 39, Ins. 15 - 16; Tr. p. 40, Ins.
9-11.
The State's second witness was Deputy Ryan Miller. Deputy Miller testified on the night
in question he and Sgt. Brandel entered the residence, walked upstairs to a bedroom, and began
knocking on the bedroom door. Tr. p. 49, In. 9 - p. 50, In. 19. After several seconds he and Sgt.
Brandel entered the bedroom and observed a female standing to the left of the bed and a male
standing to the right of the bed. Tr. p. 50, In. 19 - p. 51, In. 3. Deputy Miller approached the
female who was facing away from him. Tr. p. 51, Ins. 15- 24. Because he was initially unable to
see the female's hands Deputy Miller recalled drawing his taser. Tr. p. 51, Ins. 18-25. Deputy
Miller also explained he was wearing a video camera at the time and the recording was played
for the jury. Tr. p. 52, In. 1 - p. 53, In. 22.
Deputy Miller also testified that while they were in the bedroom Sgt. Brandel handed him
a clear plastic container that contained a rock-like crystalline substance. Tr. p. 54, In. 21 - p. 55,
In. 5. The first time he saw the plastic container it was in Sgt. Brandel's hand. Tr. p. 62, Ins. 24. Deputy Miller explained he initially put the plastic container in his pants pocket, then in the
trunk of his patrol car, and ultimately in an evidence locker at the sheriff's department. Tr. p. 55,
In. 16 - p. 56, In. 11. Deputy Miller testified he was the one who requested the substance in the
plastic container be tested for methamphetamine but no other tests were ordered. Tr. p. 58, In. 19
- p. 59, In. 7.

The State's third witness was David Sincerbeaux, a forensic scientist with the Idaho State
Police. Tr. p. 67, In. 19 - p. 68, In. 4. Mr. Sincerbeaux explained the work he does at the
laboratory and the process of testing controlled substances, and ultimately testified it was his
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opinion that the contents of the plastic container at issue was methamphetamine. Tr. p. 76, In. 4.
Mr. Sincerbeaux also testified the plastic container was not tested for fingerprints or DNA, and
that he could not say whose methamphetamine was in the plastic container. Tr. p. 78, Ins. 8-19.
The State then recalled Sgt. Brandel who opined that testing the plastic container for
fingerprints or DNA was not necessary because he believed Mr. Bennett was the one who
possessed the methamphetamine. Tr. p. 80, In. 2 - p. 84, In. 18.
William Bailey was the State's final witness. In September 2011 he resided at the house
at issue in this case and lived there with his twelve year old daughter and his daughter's mother.
Tr. p. 85, In. 20 - p. 86, In. 8. He explained that towards the end of September he allowed Mr.
Bennett, a friend of his, to stay in his daughter's bedroom, as Mr. Bennett needed a place to stay
for a few days. Tr. p. 86, In. 14 - p. 87, ln. 3; Tr. p. 89, Ins. 18-20. Mr. Bailey testified he has
regular access to his daughter's bedroom because he will clean it up or go in there for normal
parent-type reasons. Tr. p. 87, Ins. 6- 10. Mr. Bailey had never seen the plastic container at
issue. Tr. p. 88, Ins. 2-3. Mr. Bailey also testified he has let others stay in his daughter's room
on prior occasions, including a gentlemen whom Mr. Bailey understands to be a user and cook of
methamphetamine. The State then rested. Tr. p. 96, In. 25 - p. 97, In. 1.
Counsel for Mr. Bennett moved the district court for an order of acquittal pursuant to
Idaho Criminal Rule 29. Tr. p. 97, ln. 3 - p. 101, In. 23. Drawing the district court's attention to
much of this State's jurisprudence on construction possession, including State v. Garza, 112
Idaho 776, 735 P.2d 1087 (Ct. App. 1987) and State v. Maland, 124 Idaho 537, 861 P.2d 107
(Ct. App. 1993), counsel emphasized that the Court of Appeals has routinely held that mere
proximity to a controlled substance does not establish constructive possession. Id. In a case

5 •

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REVIEW

such as this where there are two occupants to a bedroom the State must present additional
evidence supporting the inference that Mr. Bennett knew and had control of the
methamphetamine. Id.
In response the State argued Mr. Bennett's proximity to the methamphetamine as well as
the methamphetamine's proximity to the men's toiletry items allows for a reasonable inference
that Mr. Bennett possessed the methamphetamine. Tr. p. 102, Ins. 1-11. The State also pointed
out Mr. Bailey, the lessee of the home, had routine access to the bedroom and had never seen the
plastic container before. Tr. p. 102, Ins. 15-21.
The district court denied Mr. Bennett's motion stating it "believes there is enough
evidence from which a reasonable jury, by implication, could find the toiletries were Mr.
Bennett's. It is the ultimate issue in the case." Tr. p. 104, Ins. 22-25.
The defense did not put on a case. Tr. p. 105, Ins. 1-3. The district court then took up the
issue of jury instructions. Mr. Bennett submitted three proposed jury instructions relating to
constructive possession and Mr. Bennett's theory of the case. R. 121-126. The first proposed
jury instruction read:
You many not infer a finding of possession from the mere fact that a defendant occupied,
with another or others, the home in which illegal drugs were found. The evidence must
establish that the charged defendant, individually, knew of the illegal drugs and that he
exercised control over them. Guilt by association is not sufficient.
R. 121-122. Mr. Bennett even proposed striking the last sentence of this proposed jury
instruction. Supplement to Transcript on Appeal, p. 101, Ins. 14-15. Nevertheless, the district
court refused to give this instruction indicating it was covered by other instructions. R. 121.
Mr. Bennett's second proposed instruction relating to constructive possession read:
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When several people occupy the same place where contraband has been found, mere
proximity to the contraband, even coupled with a defendant's knowledge of the
contraband, is not sufficient in itself to show control.
R. 123-124. The district court refused to give this instruction indicating it also was covered by

other instructions. R. 123.
Mr. Bennett's third proposed instruction relating to constructive possession read:
You may not infer a finding of possession from the mere fact that a defendant was
visiting the home in which illegal drugs were found. The evidence must establish that the
charged defendant, individually, knew of the illegal drugs and that he exercised control
over it. Guilt by association is not sufficient.
R. 125-126. Again, the district court refused to give this instruction indicating it was covered by

other instructions. R. 125. The district court simply used the Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction
421. R. 165.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty for both possession of methamphetamine and
possession of drug paraphernalia. R. 179-180; Tr. p. 109, Ins. 8-16. Mr. Bennett subsequently
entered a conditional plea of guilty to being a persistent violator. Tr. p. 113, In. 24 - p. 114, In. 8.
Mr. Bennett then filed a Rule 29 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and a Motion for New Trial
asserting the jury was not properly instructed on the applicable law at trial. R. 181-184. Briefs
in support of each motion were filed shortly thereafter. R. 185- 198. In his Brief in Support of
Motion for Acquittal Mr. Bennett further set forth and examined the law of constructive
possession in Idaho and argued the State failed to present sufficient evidence of Mr. Bennett's
knowledge and control of the methamphetamine. R. 189. In his Brief in Support of Motion for a
New Trial Mr. Bennett argued the district court erred by not giving one of Mr. Bennett's
requested instructions regarding constructive possession since the instructions were supported by
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the evidence of the case, correct statements of the law, and were not adequately covered by the
other jury instructions. R. 191-195. 1
The State filed a Brief Opposing Defendant's Motion for Acquittal (R. 217-222), arguing
sufficient circumstantial evidence existed which could be reasonably relied upon by a jury to find
Mr. Bennett guilty of both counts, as well as a Brief Opposing Defendant's Motion for a New
Trial (R. 209-216), arguing the instruction given by the district court regarding constructive
possession "adequately state[d] the law and no further instruction is necessary to explain
constructive possession." Mr. Bennett filed both a Reply Brief in Support of Motion for
Acquittal (R. 227-231) and a Reply Brief in Support of Motion for New Trial. R. 221-226.
Both parties declined further argument at a hearing held on November 19, 2012 (R. 232;
Tr. p. 120, Ins. 1-25) and the district court subsequently issued a written decision denying Mr.
Bennett's Rule 29 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and Motion for New Trial. R. 233-237. In
denying Mr. Bennett's request for a new trial the district court mistakenly cited to Idaho
Criminal Rule 29(c), instead ofidaho Criminal Rule 34, and concluded "[n]o further instruction
was necessary beyond the approved statement of the law on construction possession" citing State

v. Seitter, 127 Idaho 356,360,900 P.2d 1367, 1371 (1995). R. 233-235. The district court also
addressed Mr. Bennett's assertion of prosecutorial misconduct even though Mr. Bennett
withdrew this argument in his previously filed reply brief. R. 235-236. Finally, the district
court, again citing the wrong rule, this time referencing Idaho Criminal Rule 34 instead of the
applicable Idaho Criminal Rule 29, denied Mr. Bennett's request for a judgment of acquittal
Mr. Bennett also argued in his Brief in Support of Motion for a New Trial that his right to a
fair trial was violated because the prosecuting attorney impermissibly shifted the burden of proof
and engaged in unnecessary inflammatory tactics. R. 195-198. Mr. Bennett later withdrew this
prosecutorial misconduct argument. R. 225.
1
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stating Mr. Bennett "did not submit any additional argument or briefing regarding whether the
evidence to convict him was sufficient." R. 236. Mr. Bennett filed a Motion to Reconsider
Motion for Acquittal pointing out he had filed a Brief in Support of Motion for Acquittal on
October 4, 2012, and a Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Acquittal on November 9, 2012. R.
238-239.
At the time scheduled for Mr. Bennett's sentencing hearing the district court first
addressed Mr. Bennett's Motion to Reconsider Motion for Acquittal, stating:
The question basically is whether there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable
jury might conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Bennett did possess
methamphetamine, that he knew it was methamphetamine, and he either possessed it or
had the power to control it. And my recollection of the testimony in the trial was that
when the officers entered the room, Mr. Bennett was standing in close proximity to a
dresser. On top of that dresser were toiletries related to a male. The room was in fact the
bedroom of an 11-year old girl, who was the daughter of the tenant in the premises; that
the father of that child had allowed Mr. Bennett to use the room for a period of
approximately two days; that over a substantial period of time that parent had been in and
out of the room, had never seen any evidence of drug paraphernalia or drugs in the room.
Further, he did not know- Mr. Walsh specifically asked the tenant whether he
knew whether his daughter used drugs. The response, as I recall, was she has never been
in trouble like of that kind.
Further testimony was that Mr. Bennett was in close proximity to that dresser, not
very far at all. And the Court finds that there is sufficient evidence from which a
reasonable jury could have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Bennett either
physically possessed that those drugs and that paraphernalia the paraphernalia, as I
recall, was the bag or he had the power to exercise control. So based upon that and
based upon the Merwin case 131 Idaho 642 at 644, the Court finds that there was
sufficient evidence to convict, and the Court denies the motion to reconsider.
Tr. p. 126, In. 17 - p. 127, In. 22; see also R. 241.
Mr. Bennett was subsequently sentenced to a unified term of 9 years with 3 years
determinate for possession of a methamphetamine and 30 days in jail for possession of drug
paraphernalia. R. 244-247. A Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35 (R.
256-257) was filed and the district court reduced the determinate portion of Mr. Bennett's
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sentence for possessing methamphetamine from 3 years to 2 years. R. 274-275; Augmentation to
Transcript on Appeal, p. 12, Ins. 1-7.
This timely appeal followed. As noted above, the Court of Appeals affirmed Mr.
Bennett's judgment of conviction. Exhibit A.
C. Why Review Should be Granted
As set forth below, this Court should review the Court of Appeals' opinion because it is
not in accord with the applicable decisions of this Court and the United States Supreme Court.
The Court of Appeals' opinion is also in conflict with prior Court of Appeals' decisions, and the
opinion sanctions a departure from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings so far
as to call for an exercise of this Court's supervision. See I.AR. 118.

a.

The District Court Erred in Refusing to Give the Requested Jury Instructions and
Denying Mr. Bennett's Afotionfor a New Trial

Mr. Bennett requested that one of his three proposed instructions be provided to the jury
at the conclusion of his trial. All three instructions were accurate statements of the law and
supported by a reasonable view of the evidence. Moreover, all three supported Mr. Bennett's
legal theory at trial. The District Court nevertheless denied Mr. Bennett's request finding no
further instruction was necessary beyond Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 421.
The Court of Appeals concluded that though district courts are permitted to "further
clarify the law on constructive possession" they are not required to do so. State v. Bennett,
Docket No. 40770, pp. 5-6, (Ct. App., October 1, 2014). According to the Court of Appeals, the
"trial court properly relied on the I.CJ.I. definition of possession because I.CJ.I. 421 provides
the requirements necessary to convict a defendant of a possession charge." Id at 6. The Court
of Appeals reasoned, "a jury cannot find a defendant guilty based on mere proximity alone"
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because I.C.J.I. 421 adequately covers the law of constructive possession. Id. It may well be
true that I.C.J.I. 421 adequately covers the law of constructive possession in some cases -perhaps even most cases. But in cases such as Mr. Bennett's where it is possible a defendant
could be mistakenly convicted based on mere proximity, the jury should be further instructed,
when requested, so long as the proposed instruction is an accurate statement of the law and
supported by a reasonable view of the evidence.
At trial there was no direct evidence linking Mr. Bennett to the methamphetamine or
paraphernalia. Rather, the State's case was based entirely upon circumstantial evidence.
Because the methamphetamine was not found in Mr. Bennett's actual possession, the State was
required to establish constructive possession. In order to prove constructive possession the State
must show beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Bennett had both knowledge and control of the
methamphetamine and paraphernalia. State v. Garza, 112 Idaho 776, 778, 735 P.2d 1087, 1089
(Ct. App. 1987). Nevertheless, constructive possession may be joint or exclusive. State v.

Randles, 117 Idaho 344,347, 787 P.2d 1152, 1155 (1990).
The State believed Mr. Bennett possessed the methamphetamine at issue because when
law enforcement entered the bedroom he was standing in close proximity to the dresser that the
methamphetamine was found on top of and amongst some men's toiletries. Importantly
however, Mr. Bennett was not the sole occupant of the bedroom when the methamphetamine was
found by law enforcement - a woman was also in the bedroom. Accordingly, the State was
required to prove Mr. Bennett individually knew of the methamphetamine and that he

individually exercised dominion over it. State v. Burnside, 115 Idaho 882, 885, 771 P.2d 546,
549 (Ct. App. 1989). "It is fundamental to our system of criminal law that guilt is individual."
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Delgado v. United States, 327 F.2d 641,642 (9th Cir. 1964). Guilt by association simply is not
sufficient. State v. Vinton, 110 Idaho 832, 718 P.2d 1270 (Ct. App. 1986). Therefore, when
more than one person has access to or occupies the place where controlled substances are found
"[m]ere proximity cannot establish constructive possession." Garza, 112 Idaho at 778, 735 P.2d
at 1089; State v. Maland, 124 Idaho 537, 542, 861 P.2d 107, 112 (Ct. App. 1993).
Accordingly, Mr. Bennett requested a jury instruction based upon his theory of the case that mere proximity cannot establish constructive possession. Mr. Bennett submitted three
proposed jury instructions on the subject. R. 121-126. Arguably, the best of these instructions
was Mr. Bennett's second proposed instruction, which read:
When several people occupy the same place where contraband has been found, mere
proximity to the contraband, even coupled with a defendant's knowledge of the
contraband, is not sufficient in itself to show control.
R. 123-124. To begin with, this is an accurate statement of the law. Besides substituting
"defendant" for "accused," this jury instruction is verbatim from State v. Maland, 124 Idaho
537,542, 861 P.2d 107, 112 (Ct. App. 1993).
Secondly, the concept that proximity alone is not sufficient to sustain a conviction when
more than one person occupies or has access to the methamphetamine was not covered by other
instructions. The district court did instruct the jury that Mr. Bennett must have "possessed" the
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. R. 162 & 163. And as noted above, the district court
also included the stock instruction defining possession, Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 421. R.
165. However, contrary to the district court's notation that the content of Mr. Bennett's second
proposed instruction was already "covered," neither of the trial court's instructions touched on or
addressed Mr. Bennett's theory of defense
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the jury instructions as a whole, there is absolutely no mention or reference to this accurate
statement of the law.
Third, a reasonable view of the evidence supports giving Mr. Bennett's second proposed
jury instruction. Mr. Bennett was not observed directly possessing the methamphetamine or
paraphernalia nor did Mr. Bennett ever admit to possessing either one. Instead he, along with a
woman, was found in a bedroom in close proximity to the contraband. The district court itself
characterized this as a case in which Mr. Bennett was found in "proximity" of the contraband.
See Tr. p. 126, In. 17 - p. 127, In. 22.

The Court of Appeals decision affirming Mr. Bennett's judgment of conviction is also
contrary to prior decisions of this Court regarding a defendant's theory of the case instruction. A
"defendant in criminal action is entitled to have [the defendant's] legal theory of the case
submitted to the jury under proper instructions." State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873 Idaho 873, 88081, 736 P.2d 1327, 1334-35 (1987). The United States Supreme Court has recognized the same,
stating, "a defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there
exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor." Mathews v. United States,
485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988); see also United States v. Yarbrough, 852, F.2d 1522, 1541 (it is "well
established that a criminal defendant is entitled to have a jury instruction on any defense which
provides a legal defense to the charge against him and which has some foundation in the
evidence, even though the evidence may be weak, insufficient, inconsistent, or of doubtful
credibility").
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Finally, this Court has previously encouraged different or further instruction on the law of
constructive possession if the proposed instruction "more adequately, accurately, or clearly
state[s] the law." State v. Seitter, 127 Idaho 356,360,900 P.2d 1367, 1371 (1995).
There can be no denying Mr. Bennett's legal theory at trial, which is supported by the law
in Idaho, was that mere proximity to contraband is not sufficient to show control over the
contraband. Contrary to the Court of Appeals decision this theory was not adequately covered
by the instructions already given. I.C.J.I. 421 does not address closeness or nearness to
contraband. I.C.J.I. 421 speaks to actual possession ("physical control of it") or alternatively to
"the power and intention to control" the contraband at issue. I.C.J.I. 421 does not instruct the
jury or provide guidance as to the law when, as is the case here, the jury could reasonably
conclude that someone was simply found in close proximity to contraband.
Mr. Bennett's proposed jury instructions, especially his second proposed instruction,
were correct and pertinent. Moreover, Mr. Bennett's proposed jury instructions more accurately
and clearly state the law of constructive possession and whether mere proximity to contraband is
sufficient to sustain a conviction. More importantly, Mr. Bennett's proposed jury instructions
clearly stated his legal theory at trial. As a result, the district court's failure to give one of the
requested instructions was error.
Appellate courts exercise free review of whether a jury has been properly instructed on
the applicable law. State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65,844 P.2d 691,694 (1992). Accordingly,
this Court should accept review of Mr. Bennett's case and remand it to the district court for a
new trial. The Court of Appeals decision here is inconsistent with its prior decisions and in
conflict with decisions from this Court.
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b.

The District Court Erred in Denying Mr. Bennett's A1otions for a Judgment of
Acquittal because there was Insufficient Evidence to Sustain His Convictions

The Court of Appeals found, viewing the evidence in light most favorable to the
prosecution, that there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could
conclude Mr. Bennett constructively possessed the methamphetamine. The Court of Appeals
failed however to explain how Mr. Bennett's case is different from its prior decisions in cases
such as State v. Garza, 112 Idaho 776, 735 P.2d 1087 (Ct. App. 1987), State v. Maland, 124
Idaho 537, 861 P.2d 107 (Ct. App. 1993), and State v. Vinton, 110 Idaho 832, 718 P.2d 1270 (Ct.
App. 1986). Perhaps the omission is because Garza, Maland, and Vinton are indistinguishable
from this case. Nevertheless, it is challenging to rationalize how the Court of Appeals decision
here is not contrary and inconsistent to its prior precedent.
As set forth above, because the contraband at issue was not in Mr. Bennett's actual
possession the State was required to prove construction possession. Mr. Bennett concedes, based
upon the jurisprudence regarding constructive possession, there could be a reasonable inference
he had knowledge of the methamphetamine and paraphernalia because it was found in plain
view. See, e.g., Rogerson, 132 Idaho at 58-59, 966 P.2d at 58-59 (noting the fact that drugs and
paraphernalia found in plain view support a finding the defendant knew of their existence); State

v. Maland, 124 Idaho 537,542, 861 P.2d 107, 112 (Ct. App. 1993).
Even though the State established Mr. Bennett's proximity to the illegal contraband and
arguably a reasonable inference supporting his knowledge of its existence, there is insufficient
evidence suggesting Mr. Bennett had control over the methamphetamine and paraphernalia to
establish constructive possession. Because Mr. Bennett was not the sole occupant of the
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bedroom the State was required to present sufficient evidence of circumstances supporting the
inference that he individually exercised control over the contraband.
For instance, in ~Maland, a young man was charged with underage possession of alcohol.
Id. at 539,861 P.2d at 109. Maland, along with two other people, was found in a vehicle in a

museum parking lot after hours. Id. Maland, who was the sole occupant of the back seat, was
sitting next to an open Rainier beer case containing both full and empty cans of beer. Id. No
evidence was presented regarding the other two people or the ownership of the car. Id. No
evidence was presented regarding whether Maland smelled of beer or had consumed any beer.
Id. at 542, 861 P.2d at 112. The Court of Appeals, citing Garza, stated "[w]hen several people

occupy the same place where contraband has been found, mere proximity to the contraband, even
coupled with accused's knowledge of the contraband, is not sufficient in itself to show control."
Id. Thus, even though Maland was closer to the beer than the other two occupants, the Court of

Appeals reversed Maland's conviction stating, "[w]hile the state has shown Maland's proximity
to the beer and knowledge of its presence, the state has not shown any other circumstances that
would lead to the conclusion that he had control over the beer sufficient to establish constructive
possession." Id.
Similarly, in State v. Vinton, 110 Idaho 832, 718 P .2d 1270 (Ct. App. 1986), a husband
and wife were tried and convicted of manufacturing marijuana. The State presented a
circumstantial case tying both defendants to the marijuana and where it was discovered. Id. at
834, 718 P.2d at 1272. Again, the Court of Appeals vacated the convictions of both the husband
and wife because the State failed to adequately prove either the husband or wife individually
exercised control over the marijuana. Id. The Court of Appeals acknowledged joint occupancy
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cases create unique problems and therefore warned that "[s]uch cases require careful police
investigation before prosecution." Id.
Likewise, in State v. Garza, 112 Idaho 776, 735 P.2d 1087 (Ct. App. 1987) a husband
and wife were again accused of possessing a large quantity of marijuana. The execution of a
search warrant at the Garza residence lead to the discovery of marijuana and other contraband
throughout the house, including the master bedroom. Id. at 777, 735 P.2d at 1088. On appeal
Brenda Garza, the wife, argued the jury's verdict should be overturned because there as
insufficient evidence proving her possession of the marijuana. Id. Again, the Court of Appeals
vacated her conviction, stating, "the state failed to adduce sufficient evidence of circumstances
supporting the inference that Brenda individually exercised control over the marijuana." Id. at
778, 735 P.2d at 1089 (emphasis in original). "Where ... defendant is in non-exclusive
possession of the premises upon which drugs are found there can be no legitimate inference that
he knew of the drugs and had control of them in the absence of other circumstances such as
incriminating statements which tend to support such inference." Id. (citations omitted). Even
though both Brenda and her husband had a joint possessory interest in the property and had full
access to the areas in which the marijuana was found amongst her possessions, it could not be
inferred she had control over the marijuana. Id.

Maland, Vinton, and Garza, where there are multiple people occupying the premises
where illegal contraband is found, can be contrasted with Rozajewksi, where the defendant was
the sole occupant. Rozajewski, driving alone, was stopped and arrested for driving under the
influence. State v. Rozajewksi, 130 Idaho 644, 645, 945 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Ct. App. 1997).
While searching the vehicle law enforcement found methamphetamine in the vehicle's glove
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compartment. Id. Rozajewski was convicted at trial for possession. Id. On appeal, Rozajewski,
as did Maland, the Vintons, and Brenda Garza, argued there was insufficient evidence to support
the jury's verdict. Id. at 646,945 P.2d at 1392. The Court of Appeals affirmed Rozajewski's
conviction however, noting he was the sole occupant in the car when he was stopped and that
Rozajewski admittedly stored personal items in a large clear plastic bag which happened to also
contain a smaller bag with methamphetamine inside.D Id. at 647,945 P.2d at 1393. As such,
"there was evidence of circumstances to buttress an inference that Rozajewski knew of and
exercised control over the methamphetamine found in his vehicle's glove compartment." Id.
The nexus between Rozajewski and the methamphetamine was established.
Similar to Rozajewksi, the Court of Appeals in State v. Betancourt, 151 Idaho 635,262
P.3d 278 (Ct. App. 2011) recently held there was evidence sufficient to support a jury's guilty
verdict based upon constructive possession. As in Rozajewksi, Betancourt was the sole occupant
of the vehicle when he was stopped. Id. at 639,262 P.3d at 282. Betancourt also "had recently
been sleeping and riding in the passenger's compartment where the methamphetamine was
found, appeared nervous during his encounter with the officer, provided a confusing and
incredible explanation for his whereabouts prior to the stop, and failed a blood test for
methamphetamine." Id. Based upon this evidence the Court of Appeals concluded there was
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find a nexus between Betancourt and the
methamphetamine found in the vehicle to support a finding of constructive possession. Id.
Here, as in Maland, Mr. Bennett was admittedly closer to the illegal contraband than his
female companion when law enforcement entered the bedroom. However, the State failed to
present sufficient evidence beyond Mr. Bennett's proximity to the contraband. The State
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presented no evidence suggesting Mr. Bennett had used methamphetamine or that he was acting
nervously. No evidence of any significance was presented about the bedrooms other occupant or
her belongings. There was not even any evidence as to who owned the men's toiletries the
methamphetamine was found near or who had placed the methamphetamine on the dresser.
When two or more people occupy the same place where contraband is found the State must
prove enough that would lead to the conclusion that at least one of them individually had control
of the contraband.
Moreover, the cautionary words of the Vinton Court were ignored by law enforcement in
this case. "Careful police investigation" cannot describe what occurred here. No witness
statements were collected. The female occupant of the bedroom was not interviewed or
searched. No photographs were taken. No fingerprint testing was done on the plastic container
containing the methamphetamine. Nothing was done to further corroborate law enforcement's
belief that Mr. Bennett was the one who possessed the contraband. Nothing was done to
adequately prove Mr. Bennett individually executed control over the contraband. And unlike

Rozajewksi and Betancourt, Mr. Bennett was not the sole occupant where the illegal contraband
was found. The only evidence presented to the jury in this regard was Mr. Bennett's proximity
to the contraband and that the contraband was found near some men's toiletries. More is
required. Mere proximity cannot establish constructive possession. The evidence presented by
the State does not constitute sufficient evidence to uphold a conviction in Idaho. Accordingly,
Mr. Bennett's convictions should be reversed.
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D. Conclusion

In light of the above, Mr. Bennett respectfully asks that this Court reverse the district
court's judgment of conviction.
~
DATED this~ day of November, 2014.
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